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This article summarizes many of the criminal law deci-
sions decided by the United States Supreme Court during 
the last term. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Traffic Stops & Consent Searches 
In Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S.Ct. 417 (1996), the Supreme 
Court reversed an Ohio SupremaGourt decision, which had 
required that the officer clearly state when a citizen, validly 
detained for a traffic offense, was "legally free to go." 
Robinette had been clocked at 69 mph in a 45 mph zone. 
After the officer issued a warning and returned Robinette's 
license, the officer asked if he was carrying any illegal con-
traband in the car. Robinette answered no and consented 
to a car search. The officer found marijuana and a pill, 
which turned out to be MDMA. The officer was on drug in-
terdiction patrol at the time and routinely requested permis-
sion to search cars he stopped for traffic violations. 
The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
does not require that a lawfully detained defendant be ad-
vised that he is "free to go" before his consent be deemed a 
voluntary consent. "[T]he subjective intentions of the officer 
did not make the continued detention of [the] respondent 
illegal under the Fourth Amendment." I d. at 420. 
The Supreme Court held that the "touchstone of the 
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness," which is "measured 
in objective terms by examining the totality of the circum-
stances." ld. at 419. The Court has "eschewed bright line 
rules, instead emphasizing the fact specific nature of the 
reasonableness inquiry." ld. The Court pointed out that it 
had previously rejected similar per se rules, and it would be 
"unrealistic to require officers to always inform detainees 
that they are free to go before a consent to search may be 
deemed voluntary." ld. 
Traffic Stops & Passengers 
In Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S.Ct. 882 (1997), the 
Supreme Court held that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
434 U.S. 106 (1977), which states that an officer, as a mat-
ter of course, may order a driver of a lawfully stopped car to 
get out, extends to passengers as well. 
Wilson was a passenger in a car lawfully detained for 
speeding. Before the car pulled over, the officer observed 
the pa~senge~s behaving oddly. After the car was stopped, 
the off1cer not1ced that Wilson was sweating and appeared 
"nervous." When the officer asked Wilson to exit the car 
crack cocaine fell out of the car. Wilson was arrested, a~d 
h~ moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that ordering 
h1m out of the car was an unreasonable seizure. 
In Mimms, the Supreme Court held that an officer may 
order "persons" out of an automobile lawfully detained. 
"The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always the reasonableness in all circum-
stances of the particular governmental invasion of a citi-
zen's personal security" and "that reasonableness 'depends 
on a balance between the public interest and the individ-
ual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interfer-
ence by law officers."' 117 S.Ct. at 884-85 (citing 434 U.S. 
at 1 08-09). In Mimms, the Court held that the public interest 
in the safety of the police officer made it reasonable to ask a 
driver to step out of the car. The Court concluded that the 
risk to the officer's safety was even higher when there were 
passengers in the car. The additional number of people in-
creased the sources of harm to the officer. On the personal 
liberty side of the balance, the Court conceded that a pas-
senger's personal liberty interest is higher than a driver's 
because the driver had at least committed a traffic violation. 
The Court went on to conclude, however, that as a practical 
matter the passenger was already detained by virtue of the 
officer pulling over the car and therefore the additional intru-
sion was minimal. 
Knock & Announce Rule 
In Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (1997), the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
Fourth Amendment permits a blanket exception to the 
knock and announce requirement for felony drug offenses. 
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The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does 
not permit the blanket exception. 
In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the Supreme 
Court held that "the Fourth Amendment incorporates the 
common law requirement that police officers entering a 
dwelling must knock on the door and announce their identity 
and purpose before attempting forcible entry. At the same 
time, ... [the Court] recognized that the 'flexible require-. 
ment of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a 
rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law 
enforcement interests' and left 'to the lower courts the task 
of determining the circumstances under which an unan-
nounced entry is reasonable .... "' 117 S.Ct at 1418 (citing 
514 U.S. at 934-36). 
In Richards, the Supreme Court conceded that the knock 
and announce rule can give way under certain circum-
stances, such as when there is a threat of physical violence 
or a threat that evidence will be destroyed. However, the 
fact that felony drug investigations frequently involve these 
-two threats does not justify a per se exception. The Court 
had two concerns. First, the exception contains "consider-
able overgeneralization" and not every drug investigation 
will pose these risks. ld. at 1421. The Court pointed out 
1 
that sometimes the only people at the scene are individuals 
, 1 not involved in the criminal activity or the evidence sought is 
not the type that is easily destroyed. The second concern is 
fl·' 
; ! that an exception in one category can easily be applied to 
'. ,; __ . 1 others. The Court pointed out that armed bank robbery also 
, :· .·' frequently involves the same threats of violence towards po-
: lice and the destruction of evidence. "[T]he fact that felony 
·. ', , ':! drug investigations may frequently present circumstances 
:: · warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral 
scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the po-
. lice decision not to knock and announce in a particular 
case." ld. 
Although the Court rejected Wisconsin's per se rule, the 
Court concluded that in Richards' case the no-knock entry 
did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Richards had 
slammed the door after he had cracked it open and saw a 
police officer in uniform. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
police officers were justified in breaking the door in and 
were reasonable in their fear that Richards might hurt them 
or destroy evidence. 
Drug Testing 
In Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295 (1997), the Supreme 
Court held that Georgia's requirement that candidates for 
designated state offices certify that they passed a urinalysis 
drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination did 
not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally 
permissible suspicionless searches. The drug test had 
been challenged by Libertarian Party nominees. They 
claimed that the test violated their rights under the First, 
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit 
had decided that the Georgia law was constitutional, relying 
on three cases sustaining drug testing programs. Venonica 
School Dist., 47J v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995), involved 
random drug testing of athletes who participated in inter-
scholastic sports. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives 
Assn., 489 U.S. 602 (1989), upheld drug testing for railway 
employees involved in train accidents and those who violat-
ed certain safety rules. National Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), allowed testing of cus-
toms employees. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches 
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and seizures, and it is settled that drug tests are "searches." 
"This restraint on government conduct generally bars offi-
cials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individual-
ized suspicion. Searches conducted without grounds for 
suspicion of particular individuals have been upheld, howev-
er, in 'certain limited circumstances."' 117 S.Ct. at 1298. In 
order to qualify as a "limited circumstance" there must be a 
showing that the test serves a "special need" other than the 
"ordinary needs of law enforcement." ld. at 1299. After 
there is a showing of special need, the Court will "balance 
the individual's privacy expectations against the 
Government's interests to determine whether it [was] im-
practical to require a warrant or some level of individualized 
suspicion in the particular context."' ld. (citing Von Raab, 
489 U.S. at 656). 
The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that 
the testing method prescribed by the statute was relatively 
noninvasive. The Court then went on to answer the ques-
tion of whether the certification requirement was warranted 
by a "special need." The Court's "precedents establish that 
the proffered special need for drug testing must be substan-
tial - important enough to override the individual's ac-
knowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress 
the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individual-
ized suspicion." ld. at 1303. The Court concluded that 
Georgia failed to show a special need. 
First, the Court pointed out that the program was not well 
designed to identify candidates as drug abusers nor was it 
an effective means of deterrence. The candidate could ab-
stain from drug use in the period prior to the test since he 
knew when the test would be. The Court did not under-
stand why ordinary law enforcement methods were not suf-
ficient to detect addicted individuals, especially since the of-
ficials would be in the public limelight. Georgia relied most 
heavily on the Court's decision in Von Raab, which allowed 
for drug testing of Customs Service officers prior to promo-
tion or transfer even in the absence of individualized suspi-
cion. There also was no evidence in Von Raab of a particu-
lar problem among employees like there had been among 
the railroad workers in Skinner and the student athletes in 
Vernonia. Georgia claimed that the reasons for drug testing 
were closely aligned with the reasons given in Von Raab. 
In Von Raab, the Court held that the government had a 
compelling interest to ensure that the "front line interdiction 
personnel" were not only fit but of "impeachable integrity 
and judgment." ld. at 1304. Because of their work, cus-
toms officials are constantly exposed to organized crime 
and susceptible to bribery and blackmail. These reasons 
are similar to the ones that the State used as justification for 
enacting the statute. The Court pointed out that there was a 
"telling difference" between Von Raab's and Georgia's drug 
testing provision. It is not "'feasible to subject employees 
[required to carry firearms or concerned with interdiction of 
controlled substances] and their work product to the kind of 
day-to-day scrutiny that is the norm in more traditional office 
environments."' ld. (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674). 
Candidates in public office are subject to heightened day-to-
day scrutiny, and therefore drug abuse is detectable absent 
a drug testing program. 
The Court concluded that Georgia, despite the reasons 
given, was merely interested in projecting an image of the 
State's commitment to the struggle against drug abuse. 
Georgia had no evidence of a particular problem among its 
officials, and the officials covered by the statute did not per-
form high risk safety sensitive tasks like the railroad employ-
ees. The certification did not immediately aid any interdic-
tion effort as it did with the customs agents in Von Raab. In 
short, the need was only symbolic and not "special" and 
was not sufficient to override the privacy interest protected 
by the Fourth Amendment. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Sentence Enhancement 
In United States v. Watts, 117 S.Ct. 633 (1997), two sep-
arate cases were filed in a single petition for certiorari. In 
both cases, the sentencing courts enhanced the defen-
dants' sentences because of conduct for which they had 
been acquitted and, in both cases, the Ninth Circuit had re-
versed. The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court's de-
cision conflicted with the clear implications of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, and the Supreme Court's prior decisions, 
particularly Witte v. United states, 115 S.Ct 2199 (1995). 
18 U.S.C. § 3661 states that "[n]o limitation shall be 
placed on information concerning the background, charac-
ter, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a 
court of the United States may receive and consider for the 
purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." Before the 
Sentencing Guidelines, it was "well established" that the 
sentencing judge could consider facts related to other 
charges even if the defendant had been acquitted of those 
charges. This discretion did not change with the Sentencing 
Guidelines. Quoting Witte, the Court held that "[relevant 
conduct] corresponds to those actions and circumstances 
that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior 
to the Guidelines' enactment." The Court pointed to Section 
181.4 of the Guidelines, which mirrors the language in§ 
3661. Section 151.3 also contains "sweeping language" as 
to what a sentencing judge may consider. The commentary 
to that section states that a judge may consider "conduct not 
formally charged or is not an element of the offense of con-
viction." The sentencing court may consider "all acts and 
omissions ... that were part of the same course of conduct 
or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." 
The Supreme Court commented that the Court of 
Appeals position was also based on an erroneous view of 
double jeopardy jurisprudence. "[S]entencing enhance-
ments do not punish a defendant for crimes of which he 
was not convicted, but rather increase his sentence be-
cause of the manner in which he committed the crime of 
conviction." ld. at 636 (quoting Witte, 115 S.Ct. at 2207-08). 
The Court also pointed out that the Ninth Circuit misun-
derstood the "preclusive effect of an acquittal, when it as-
serted that a jury 'rejects' some facts when it returns a ver-
dict of not guilty." I d. at 637. There are different standards 
of proof that govern at trial and at sentencing. Acquittal 
does not necessarily mean that a defendant is innocent but 
that the prosecution failed to prove an essential element of 
the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court noted that 
an acquittal is not a finding of fact and does not preclude 
the Government from relitigating the fact under a lower bur-
den of proof. The Guidelines state that the appropriate 
standard at sentencing is a preponderance of the evidence. 
CONTEMPT: DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 
In Pounders v. Watson, 117 S.Ct. 2359 (1997), a criminal 
defense attorney, Penelope Watson, had been subject to 
summary contempt by the trial court for asking questions on 
a subject that had already been forbidden by the judge both 
in open court and at several bench conferences. The attar-
3 
ney had petitioned for federal habeas relief, alleging that the 
summary contempt violated due process. The Ninth Circuit 
held the summary contempt invalid, but the Supreme Court 
reversed. 
Watson's client was on trial for killing a gang member 
and was being tried with other codefendants. On three sep-
arate occasions, the counsel of different codefendants 
raised in open court the issue of the punishment the defen-
dants might receive if found guilty. On each occasion, the 
trial judge ·stated that possible punishment was not a sub-
ject that should be discussed in open court. Ms. Watson, 
though not included in the bench conferences per se, was 
within six feet of the side bar conferences. She was also 
present in court when the trial judge stated that the subject 
would not be explored because it was prejudicial. The 
judge felt that since the victim was a gang member the jury 
would refuse to convict if they knew what a harsh penalty 
could be imposed on someone killing such an unworthy per-
son. 
Ms. Watson was questioning her client when she 
broached the forbidden subject. The prosecutor asked that 
she be admonished and she was. Immediately following 
the exchange, she asked the defendant if he knew he was 
facing life without parole. The judge held her in contempt. 
The judge gave Watson two opportunities to justify her ac-
tions. She stated that she thought her questions were rele-
vant, and she did not think the questions were covered by 
his previous ruling. The judge found that her questions had 
permanently prejudiced the jury in favor of her client. The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that her due process rights 
were violated because she did not have notice and the trial 
judge could not have known without a hearing if Watson's 
conduct was willful. 
The Supreme Court stressed that a court needs summa-
ry contempt to preserve order in the courtroom. The Court 
held that the "the summary contempt exception to the nor-
mal due process requirements, such as a hearing, counsel, 
and the opportunity to call witnesses, 'includes only charges 
of misconduct, in open court, in the presence of the judge, 
which disturbs the court's business, where all the essential 
elements of the misconduct are under the eye of the court, 
are actually observed by the court, and where immediate 
punishment is essential to prevent 'demoralization of the 
court's authority before the public."' ld. at 2362 (quoting In 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,275 (1948)). The Court of Appeals 
had required a finding of repeated violations by a contemnor 
that was sufficiently disruptive to threaten the dignity of the 
court. The Supreme Court disagreed and pointed out that 
summary contempt convictions had been upheld after a sin-
gle violation. The Court of Appeals had "glossed over'' the 
state court findings that the comments had permanently 
prejudiced the jury. The Supreme Court held that this find-
ing by the trial court, plus the assessment of Watson's clear 
defiance of a court order, was all that was needed to sup-
port a summary contempt conviction. Due process imposes 
limits but "states must have latitude in determining what 
conduct so infects orderly judicial proceedings that con-
tempt is permitted." ld. at 2363. While the Court would not 
explore the limits of the states' latitude, the Court held that 
Watson's conduct fell well within the range of contemptuous 
conduct. 
DEFENSE OFFERS TO STIPULATE 
In Old Chief v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 644 (1997), the 
Supreme Court held that the district court had abused its 
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discretion by failing to accept the defendant's offer to stipu-
late. Old Chiefwas charged with possession of a firearm by 
anyone with a prior felony conviction. Old Chief's previous 
conviction was assault causing serious bodily harm. To 
prove that a defendant has a previous conviction, the prose-
cution can introduce a record of judgment. To prevent the 
jury from hearing the nature of the previous offense, Old 
Chief offered to stipulate that he had been convicted of a 
felony. He feared undue prejudice if the jury heard the na-
ture of his prior offense, and he claimed that his offer to stip-
ulate rendered evidence of the name and nature of his prior 
offense inadmissible under Federal Evidence Rule 403. 
Rule 403 provides that otherwise relevant evidence may be 
excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially out-
weighs the evidence's probative value. 
The prosecution refused to stipulate and introduced the 
judgment. The jury found Old Chief guilty. The Ninth Circuit 
ruled that the government was entitled to prove the prior 
conviction element using probative evidence and that a stip-
ulation has no place in the Federal Rules of Evidence bal-
ancing act. 
The Supreme Court held that Old Chief's argument that 
the name of his prior conviction as contained in the docu-
mentary evidence was irrelevant under FRE 401 and there-
fore inadmissible under FRE 402, was erroneous. "[E]vi-
dentiary relevance under Rule 401 [is not] affected by avail-
ability of alternative proofs of the element, [such as stipula-
tion], to which it went .... " ld at 649. "Exclusion must rest 
not on the ground that the other evidence rendered it 'irrele-
vant,' but on its character as unfairly prejudicial, cumulative 
or the like, its relevance notwithstanding." ld. at 650. 
The Supreme Court saw the principal issue as the scope 
of a trial judge's discretion under FRE 403. The Court de-
scribed unfair prejudice as the "capacity of some conceded-
ly relevant evidence to lure the fact-finder into declaring guilt 
on a ground different from proof specific of the offense 
charged." ld. The danger in this case was that the jury, on 
hearing the nature of Old Chief's previous conviction, would 
assume that he had a propensity for this type of behavior 
and judge him as acting in the present situation in conformi-
ty with this type of character. FRE 404(b) addresses 
propensity reasoning directly by making evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts inadmissible to prove conformity 
with character. 
Evidence of a prior conviction can have a legitimate pur-
pose as well as an illegitimate one. It can be introduced, as 
the state did here, to prove an element of a crime. But 
when a single piece of evidence has two purposes, the evi-
dence is subject to analysis under FRE 403, and its balanc-
ing between unfair prejudice and probative value. The pros-
ecution is entitled to prove its case by admissible evidence 
of its own choice, and a "defendant's Rule 403 objection of-
fering to concede a point generally cannot prevail over the 
Government's choice to offer evidence showing guilt and all 
the circumstances surrounding the offense." ld. at 651. 
While conceding that the prosecution's burden needs "evi-
dentiary depth," the Supreme Court held that this need had 
no application when the point at issue was the defendant's 
legal status. Congress did not distinguish between what 
types of felonies a person charged under § 922(g)(1) had to 
be convicted of, only that he had been convicted. The pros-
ecution lost nothing in accepting the stipulation, while the 
Government's use of the judgment with the name of the of-
fense did risk unfair prejudice by the jury. The Court re-
versed, concluding that the "risk of unfair prejudice did sub-
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stantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the 
record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to 
admit the record when an admission was available." 
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA 
In United States v. Hyde, 117 S.Ct. 1630 (1997), Hyde 
had plead guilty to several fraud counts pursuant to a plea 
agreement that involved dismissal of four other charges. 
The District Court accepted the plea after an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether Hyde was pleading guilty 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The District Court 
deferred accepting the plea agreement until after the com-
pletion of the pre_sentence report. The defendant attempted 
to withdraw his plea after its acceptance but before the 
court accepted the plea agreement. The District Court de-
nied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that the defendant had "an absolute righf' to withdraw his 
guilty plea before the District Court accepted the plea 
agreement. The Supreme Court held that the Court of 
Appeals' ruling not only contradicted the language of 
Federal Criminal Rules 11 and 32(e) but also would "de-
grade the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty into some-
thing akin to a move in a game of chess." ld. at 1634. 
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Criminal Rule 32(e) provides that if a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea is made before sentence is imposed, the court 
may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows 
"any fair and just reason." Rule 11, the principal provision 
dealing with guilty pleas and plea agreements, does not 
preclude a district court from accepting a guilty plea without 
first accepting the plea agreement. Also, Rule 11 (e) divides 
plea agreements into three types based on what the 
Government agrees to do. Hyde's plea was a type A agree-
ment, where the Government agrees to move for dismissal d 
of other charges. Rule 11 (e)(2) explicitly states that, as to a 
type A agreement, the court may accept, reject, or defer ac-
ceptance/rejection of the plea agreement until after the pre-
sentence report. If the court rejects the plea, then Rule 
11 (e)(4) becomes significant. This section states that after 
rejection the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity 
to withdraw his plea for any reason without complying with 
Rule 32(e)'s ''fair and just requirement." If a defendant may 
withdraw for any reason prior to acceptance of the plea 
agreement, then the rejection of an agreement as laid out in 
Rule 11 (e)(4), with its explicit opportunity to withdraw, would 
have no significance. 
The Supreme Court also concluded that it would be diffi-
cult to see any purpose for Rule 32(e), and its requirement 
to show a ''fair and just reason" for withdrawing a plea if the 
Court of Appeals' holding were correct. Under the Court of 
Appeals' interpretation, there would be little time during 
which the "fair and just reason" standard would apply. It 
would be applicable only between the time the plea agree-
ment was accepted and sentence was imposed and both 
acceptance and sentencing usually took place at the same 
time. The Supreme Court saw "no indication in the Rules to 
suggest that Rule 32(e) can be eviscerated in this manner, 
and the Court of Appeals did not point to one." ld. at 1635. 
SEXUAL PREDATOR STATUTES 
In Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997), the ~ 
Supreme Court upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent 
Predator Act in face of challenges on substantive due proc-
ess, double jeopardy, and ex post facto grounds. The Court 
held that the Act's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfied 
the substantive due process requirements for civil commit-
ment and because the Act did not establish criminal pro~ 
ceedings, ·challenges on double jeopardy and ex post facto 
grounds were precluded. 
Hendricks was the first to be committed under the 
'<"ansas procedures for civil involuntary commitment of per-
Jns who, due to a "mental abnormality or personality disor-
der" are likely to engage in "predatory acts of sexual vio-
lence." The legislature passed the Act to deal with repeat 
sex offenders because it believed that the civil commitment 
procedures were inadequate to cope with this subclass of 
mentally ill persons. Because the likelihood of repeated 
acts is high and the prognosis for rehabilitation in general 
and particularly in a prison setting i$ poor, the legislature es-
tablished a special civil commitment procedure for sexually 
violent predators. A sexually violent predator is defined as 
"any person who has been convicted of or charged with a 
sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental ab-
normality or personality disorder which makes the person 
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence." The 
Act defined "mental abnormality'' as a "congenital or ac-
quired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capaci-
ty which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent 
offense in a degree constituting such person as a menace 
to the health and safety of society." 
The prosecutor files the petition for involuntary commit-
ment. The court determines if probable cause exists to sup-
port a finding that the soon-to-be-released prisoner is a sex-
ually violent predator. If the court makes such a determina-
tion, the individual is evaluated and then a trial is held. If 
the prosecutor proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
individual is a sexually violent predator, he is committed for 
control and treatment until he is no longer a danger to soci-
:ty. The Act has a number of procedural safeguards. The 
Durden of proof is on the State and indigents are provided 
counsel and an examination by a mental health expert. A 
person may present and cross-examine witnesses and re-
view documentary evidence. Once confined, an individual 
can, at any time, file a release petition or the State may file 
one if he is cured. The individual is afforded an annual re-
view, with a court determining beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the individual still qualifies for confinement. 
Hendricks was a repeat sex offender, and he admitted at 
his commitment hearing that he was not cured. The jury 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that he qualified as a sex-
ually violent predator, and he was ordered committed. 
The Supreme Court ruled that a finding of "mental abnor-
mality" satisfied due process requirements. "Although free-
dom from physical restraint 'has always been at the core of 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from gov-
ernmental action,' ... that liberty interest is not absolute." 
ld. at 2079 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 
(1992)). In certain narrow circumstances, the courts have 
upheld involuntary civil commitment when a person's be-
havior threatens the public welfare. The.Act requires more 
than a finding of dangerousness, which standing alone is 
not sufficient grounds for confinement. The Act also re-
quires a "mental abnormality or personality disorder'' with 
substantial evidence that the individual will commit the acts 
again if not confined. The Court found that the Act's re-
'luirements served to adequately limit confinement to those 
Nho were dangerous beyond their own control. The Court 
did not accept Hendricks' argument that mental abnormality 
did not mean the same thing as mental illness. The Court 
noted that psychiatrists and even the Court itself has used 
different expressions to mean the same thing. Although 
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substantive due process requires a finding of "mental ill-
ness," the Court has never required States to adopt any 
"particular nomenclature" when drafting civil commitment 
statutes. The Court held that Hendricks met the criteria re-
lating to a person's inability to control his dangerousness 
set forth in this act and other valid civil commitment 
statutes. 
On Hendricks' double jeopardy and ex post facto claims, 
the Court held that without the establishment of a criminal 
proceeding by the statute and confinement that amounts to 
punishment, these two prohibitions do not come into play. 
The Court concluded that the commitment was civil in na-
ture. The Court did not accept the civil label as dispositive 
but rather looked at the intent of the confinement. Criminal 
confinement is meant to punish or serve as a deterrence. 
This type of confinement was meant to do neither. The 
Court remarked that Hendricks' focus on the confinement's 
potentially indefinite duration was misplaced since the Act 
tied duration to the stated purpose of confinement. Once 
cured, a person was free to leave. Confinement without 
some type of review was, at the most, for one year. If the 
State wishes to hold a person longer, the court must once 
again determine·beyond a reasonable doubt that confine-
ment is warranted. 
Hendricks also argued that because there is no known 
treatment for his illness, the involuntary confinement really 
amounts to punitive treatment. The Court stated that the 
fact that a legislature's overriding concern is to keep the of-
fender from the public and the goal of rehabilitation is inci-
dental because treatment is almost nonexistent does not, in 
itself, turn the confinement into punishment. Hendricks' 
double jeopardy claim also failed because the Act did not 
impose punishment. 
PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE 
In Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997), the 
Supreme Court considered a state statute making it a felony 
to assist a suicide. Four physicians, three terminally ill pa-
tients, and a nonprofit organization had sought declaratory 
judgment that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
burdened a liberty interest protected by the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court held that the right to assistance in com-
mitting suicide was not a fundamental liberty. The Court 
also concluded that the Washington statute was rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest. 
The opinion provides a lengthy analysis of the Nation's 
history, legal traditions, and practices. Almost every State 
makes it a crime to assist suicide. For over 700 years the 
Anglo American common law tradition has been to punish 
suicide and the assistance in suicide. Suicide has been re-
ferred to as "self murder'' and although the Nation has abol-
ished some of its more harsh common law penalties, there 
has not been a widespread acceptance of suicide or the as-
sistance in suicide. More importantly, the prohibitions 
against assisting suicide have never contained exceptions 
for those near death, hopelessly diseased, or unduly suffer-
ing. In recent years, because of improved medical technol-
ogy, the assisted suicide prohibitions have been reexam-
ined. The public focus has been on how best to protect 
one's dignity and independence in end of life decision mak-
ing. While there has been acceptance of provisions for re-
fusal of life sustaining medical treatment, most people have 
rejected any move toward assisted suicide. 
"The Due Process Cause guarantees more than fair 
process, and the 'liberty' it protects includes more than the 
absence of physical restraint" I d. at 2:267 (quoting Collins 
v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)). Not only are the 
freedoms listed in the Bill of Rights protected, but also the 
right to marry, to have children, to direct the upbringing of 
one's children, to enjoy marital privacy, to use contracep-
tion, to enjoy bodily integrity, and to have an abortion. But 
the Court has "'always been reluctant to expand the con-
cept of substantive due process because guideposts for re-
sponsible decision making in this unchartered area are 
scarce and open-ended."' ld. (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 
125). 
The Court's "established method of sub9tantive-due-
process analysis has two primary features: First, ... [the 
Court has] regularly observed that the Due Process Clause 
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties 
which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history 
and tradition."' ld. at 2268. Next, the Court has required a 
"careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty in-
terest. ld. (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 
(1993)). The Court concluded that the asserted right, as-
sisted suicide, had no place in the Nation's tradition and to 
embrace this right would be to reverse centuries of legal 
doctrine and practice. Although the Court had upheld the 
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition in Cruzan v. 
Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), this right 
was not grounded in abstract concepts of personal autono-
my extending to a "right to die" but rather in long standing 
concepts and common-law rules that forced medication was 
battery and one had a right to refuse medical treatment. In 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U;S. 1 (1973), the Court held that although protected liber-
ties are referred to as "personal autonomy'' rights, it does 
not necessarily follow that all important, personal and inti-
mate decisions are constitutionally protected. 
The Court found that the Washington statute easily com-
plied with the constitutional requirement that a prohibition be 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The 
government could legitimately seek to preserve human life 
and prohibit intentional killing. Suicide was viewed as a se-
rious public health problem especially among the more vul-
nerable in society like the young, the elderly, the poor, the 
disabled and those suffering from mental disorders and de-
pression caused by untreated pain. It is necessary to pro-
tect these vulnerable groups from psychological and finan-
cial pressures to end their lives and thus avoid a slippery 
slope towards voluntary or even involuntary euthanasia. 
The Government has an interest in protecting the integrity of 
the medical profession. The Court concluded that these in-
terests were "unquestionably important and legitimate, and 
Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably 
related to their promotion and protection." 117 S.Ct. at 2275. 
Equal Protection 
In Vacca v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293 (1997), the Supreme 
Court determined that New York's prohibition on physician 
assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
In New York it is a crime to intentionally cause or aid anoth-
er to commit or attempt suicide. A patient may, however, 
refuse even lifesaving medical treatment, and the physician 
who honors that request is free from punishment. 
Physicians sued the State's Attorney General, claiming that 
honoring a request for refusal of treatment and physician 
assisted suicide were essentially the same thing and since 
the State allowed one and not the other the State was treat-
6 
ing similarly situated patients differently. 
The Supreme Court recognized that the Equal Protection 
Clause, while requiring that States must treat like cases 
alike, does not require the States to treat unlike cases ac-
cordingly. Since the statute does not involve a fundamental 
right or a suspect class, it is entitled to a strong presumption 
of validity. The Court found that New York was treating all 
competent patients evenhandedly. All could refuse medical 
treatment, and no one was permitted to be .assisted in the 
act of suicide. The Court of Appeals saw the class as termi-
nally ill patients, all similar except one class was allowed to 
"hasten death" and one was not. In contrast, the Supreme 
Court saw a cjistinction between the class of persons refus-
ing life sustaining treatment and those asking for physician 
assisted suicide. The Court said that this distinction was ra.,. 
tiona! and supported by most States and the A.M.A. 
The Court concluded that the purpose of allowing a pa-
tient to refuse treatment was not to allow the patient to "has-
ten death" but rather to respect his wishes concerning futile 
treatment. A person refusing treatment may not have the in-
tent to die but a person asking for help in committing suicide 
must necessarily have that intent. The Court held that if a 
classification is rationally based it was of no constitutional 
concern that particular groups (such as those terminally ill 
who are not on life support) receive uneven treatment. The 
Supreme Court also found that the legislative classification 
in the statute's ban on assisted suicide while permitting re-
fusal of treatment was rationally related to valid State inter-
ests such as preserving life, preventing suicide, physician 
integrity, and protection of vulnerable persons. 
CONCURRENT SENTENCING 
In United States v. Gonzales, 117 S.Ct. 1032, (1997), 
three respondents had been convicted under state laws for 
drug trafficking and the use of firearms during drug traffick-
ing crimes. They had begun to serve their state sentences 
when they were also convicted on various similar federal 
drug charges and, in particular, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which 
covers the use of firearms during drug crimes. The District 
Court had concluded that the portion of their federal sen-
tences attributable to their drug convictions could run con-
currently with their state sentences, but the plain language 
of§ 924(c) required that the remaining five year sentence, 
attributable to the use of firearms, would run consecutively. 
Section 924(c) states that "the term of imprisonment im-
posed under this subsection [shall not] run concurrently with 
any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for 
the ... drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used 
or carried." (emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuit vacated the firearms sentences and 
held that the sentences could run concurrently, finding sec-
tion 942(c)'s language ambiguous. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine if the phrase "any other term 
of imprisonment" means what it says or only applies to fed-
eral sentences. The Court held that the word "any" had an 
expansive meaning and the statute did not refer only to fed-
eral sentences. The Court pointed out that the legislature 
had expressly limited "any crime" to federal crimes and had 
not chosen to place a similar restrictive modifier when it 
spoke of "any sentence." The Supreme Court found nothing 4 
remarkable or ambiguous about Congress' choice of words ' 
in the statute. The Court held that a federal court may not 
direct that a prison sentence under§ 924(c) run concurrent- . 
ly with a state imposed sentence because the plain mean-
ing of the statute makes it clear that it "shall not" do so. 
PAROLE REVOCATION 
In Young v. Harper, 117 S.Ct. 1148 (1997), the Supreme 
Court ruled that Oklahoma's Preparole Conditional Super-:-
vision Program was sufficiently similar to parole to require 
the same due process protections set forth in Morrissey v. 
'rewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
Oklahoma has two programs under which an inmate can 
be conditionally released before the end of his sentence, 
parole and preparole. Preparole becomes an option when 
the prisons exceed a certain percentage over capacity. 
Harper, who had served 15 years of a life sentence for two 
murders, was simultaneously recommended for parole and 
released under the preparole program. While the Pardon 
and Parole Board decides who will be released under the 
preparole program, the Governor has the final say on pa-
role. After Harper had been out for five months, the 
Governor denied his petition for parole and Harper was or-
dered back to prison. 
The essence of parole is the early conditioned release 
from prison before the end of one's sentence, and the na-
ture of the interest of the parolee is continued liberty. The 
Court found that the preparole program served the same 
purpose and involved the same liberty interest. The peti-
tioners tried to distinguish preparole from parole, but the 
Court found these differences to be merely "phantom differ-
ences" or too insignificant to place removal from the prepa-
role program beyond due process procedural protections. 
The Court saw three real differences in the program: (1) the. 
Pardon and Parole Board decides who is eligible for the 
preparole program and the Governor has the final say on 
parole, (2) escaped preparolees are treated as if they es-
caped from prison and escaped parolees are subject only to 
1arole revocation, and (3) preparolees can not leave the 
sate for any reason and parolees may leave at the discre-
tion of the parole officer. The Court concluded that these 
differences only set the preparole program apart from the 
specific terms of parole in Oklahoma, but not apart from the 
more general class of parole identified in Morrissey, and 
therefore removal from either program required due process 
pro~ection. 
EX POST FACTO 
In Lynce v Mathis, 117 S.Ct. 891 (1997), the Supreme 
Court considered an ex post facto claim arising from the 
retroactive cancellation of a prisoner's provisional early re-
lease credits, which had been awarded to alleviate prison 
overcrowding. In 1983, the Florida Legislature established 
the early release program, and Lynce was released in 1992. 
Subsequently, the state Attorney General interpreted a 1992 
statute as canceling retroactively credits for those who had 
committed murder or attempted murder. Because Lynce fell 
into this category, he was rearrested and returned to prison. 
The Supreme Court ruled that this action violated the Ex 
Post Facto Clause. The Clause is violated when the state 
increases punishment of an offense after it has been com-
mitted. The prohibition applies when the law is (1) retro-
spective and (2) disadvantages the offender. The Court 
stated that the motivation of the legislature was irrelevant. 
For the Court, the critical issue was the effect of the legisla-
·on -here, the cancellation of 1 ,869 days of accumulated 
provisional credits and whether the cancellation lengthened 
the petitioner's incarceration. "[R]etroactive alteration of pa-
role or early release provisions, like the retroactive applica-
tion of provisions that govern the initial sentencing, impli-
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cates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such credits are 
'one determinant of petitioner's] prison term ... and ... [the 
petitioner's] effective sentence is altered once this determi-
nant is changed."' ld. at 898 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 
450 U.S. 24, 32 (1981 )). The Court distinguished a prior 
case, California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S.Ct. 
1597 (1995). "Unlike the California amendment at issue in 
Morales, the 1992 Florida statute did more than simply re-
move a mechanism that created an opportunity for early re-
lease for a class of prisoners whose early release was un-
likely; rather it made ineligible for early release a class of 
prisoners who were previously eligible - including some, 
like petitioner, who had actually been released." 117 S.Ct. at 
898. 
RETROACTIVITY 
In Lambrix v. Singletary, 117 S.Ct. 1517 (1997), the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
Court's decision in Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 
(1992), announced a "new rule" as defined in Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), and therefore could not be ap-
plied retroactively to petitioner's federal habeas proceeding. 
Lambrix was given a death sentence in Florida, a "weigh-
ing state," and sought post conviction relief. Florida has a 
three part sentencing procedure. First, the jury renders an 
a?visory opinion by weighing statutorily specific aggravating 
Circumstances against any mitigating factors. Second, the 
trial court does an independent weighing of the aggravating 
and mitigating factors and enters a sentence of life impris-
onment or death. Third, the Florida Supreme Court reviews 
all cases in which the defendant is sentenced to death. 
Lambrix contended that the jury instruction concerning the 
"especially heinous and atrocious" aggravating circum-
stance failed to provide sufficient guidance to limit the jury's 
discretion and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. 
The State had contended that Lambrix was not entitled to 
relief because the trial court had properly used a narrower 
aggravator. 
In Espinosa, decided after Lambrix's conviction, the 
Supreme Court held that if "a 'weighing state' requires the 
sentencing trial judge to give deference to a jury's advisory 
recommendation, neither the judge nor the jury is constitu-
tionally permitted to weigh invalid aggravating circum-
stances." 117 S.Ct. at 1524. Lambrix was seeking to apply 
this principle retroactively, and the State contended that the 
holding in Espinosa is a "new rule" under Teague and could 
not be relied on in a federal habeas proceeding. 
In Teague, the Supreme Court held that "'new constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to 
those cases which have become final before the new rules 
are announced."' ld. (citing 489 U.S. at 310). To apply 
Teague, a federal court must: (1) determine the date on 
which conviction became final, (2) survey the legal land-
scape as it then existed and determine whether a state 
court, considering the defendant's claim at the time the con-
viction became final, would have felt compelled by existing 
precedent to conclude that the rule was required by the 
Constitution, and (3) if the announced rule is considered a 
new rule, determine whether the relief sought falls within 
two narrow exceptions. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the holding in 
Espinosa was not dictated by then existing precedent and 
therefore was a "new rule" as defined by Teague and not to 
apply retroactively. Espinosa did not rely on any controlling 
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precedent and only cited one case using a "ct.", which 
snows that the supporting authority is dictum or analogy and 
ndtControlling:Thetnree cases tliat Lambrix relied on to 
define the legal landscape were distinguished by the Court. 
All three cases dealt with impermissibly vague aggravators 
and supported the proposition that aggravators must be nar-
rowed to prevent arbitrary imposition of the death sentence. 
But, a sentencing jury's consideration of a vague aggravator 
can be cured on appeal and the Court was more con-
cerned, in these cases, by the failure of the appellate court 
to cure the error and not necessarily concerned with the 
jury's consideration of a vague aggravator standing alone. 
The Supreme Court, after reviewing the legal landscape at 
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the time of Lambrix's conviction, was persuaded that a "rea-
sonable jurist considering Lambrix's sentence in 1986 could 
have reached a conclusion different from the one Espinosa 
announced in 1992." ld. at 1527. 
Even though Espinosa is a new rule, the petitioner's / 
claim could fall under two exceptions to the non-retroactivity~ 
doctrine. The Supreme Court held that neither exception 
applied. Espinosa does not decriminalize a class of con-
duct nor prohibits the imposition of the death sentence on a 
particular class of individuals, nor does Espinosa stand tor a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure that implicates the 
criminal proceeding's fundamental fairness and accuracy. 
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